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Context Graphs for Legal Reasoning and
Argumentation
Max RAPP a, Axel ADRIAN a and Michael KOHLHASE a
a FAU Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg
Abstract. We propose a new, structured, logic-based framework for legal reason-
ing and argumentation: Instead of using a single, unstructured meaning space, the-
ory graphs organize knowledge and inference into collections of modular meaning
spaces organized by inheritance and interpretation. Context graphs extend theory
graphs by attack relations and interpret theories as knowledge contexts of agents
in argumentation. We introduce the context graph paradigm by modeling the well-
studied case Popov v. Hayashi, concentrating on the role of analogical reasoning in
context graphs.
Keywords. Legal Argumentation, Theory Graphs, Reasoning with Legal Cases
1. Introduction
There is a huge literature in legal theory regarding the methods of jurisprudence; see e.g.
[Ash17,Blu03,Har12,Mac78]. But there is no consensus on how legal thinking actually
works or should work in detail. One area of dissent is between rule-based and analogical
reasoning when discussing precedent in case law systems [Ste18]. However, it seems all
approaches structurally combine the legal rule of a case – especially of a leading case –
and the legally important facts of the present case [Adr09, p. 879].
This structural combination of laws and facts can be represented in formal systems as
a logical syllogism: for each case to be decided it has to be checked in detail whether the
legally relevant facts can be “subsumed” under the conditions of an applicable legal rule.
See e.g. [Mac78, p. 19ff, 229ff], [Har12, p. 124ff], or [Adr09, p. 777ff] for a discussion.
This is sometimes [Eng97, p.23ff] seen as establishing the analogical equivalence of the
present case and a legally relevant precedent.
Contribution We propose to capture these analogical modes of reasoning in a new,
structured, logic-based framework for legal reasoning and argumentation: context
graphs. These structure legal and world knowledge into theories, which are organized
into a strongly interconnected graph by inheritance, interpretation, and argumentation
relations. This graph structure drives knowledge processing and argumentation.
Overview Section 2 reviews the relevant state of the art in legal reasoning. Section 3
introduces the context graphs framework and applies it to the Popov v. Hayashi case.
Section 4 shows rule and precedence case application in the case and Section 5 discusses
the fine points of analogical transfer in these applications. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. State of the Art in Modelling Legal Reasoning with Cases
Capturing and automating how law practitioners reason with cases has been a major
focus in legal AI since the HYPO [Ash90] and CATO [Ale97] systems of the late 80s
and early 90s. There are two main approaches in modelling legal reasoning with cases:
rule-based and analogy-based reasoning [Ste18,ABC19].
In analogical approach the similarity of cases is assessed based on aspects. That is,
dimensions of cases that range from maximally pro-defendant to maximally pro-plaintiff
and boolean factors that pertain either to the defendant or to the plaintiff. Conflicting
arguments for different possible precedent applications are then constructed based on
the degree to which cases resemble each other in terms of their aspects [BC12,ABC19].
The main implementations of the analogical approach are the HYPO [Ash90] and CATO
systems [Ale97]. In the rule-based approach, precedents are taken to extend the existing
body of law by their respective “rule of the case” which is encoded as a defeasible in-
ference rule in the object language of some logic (e.g. [Pra12]). Defeasibility is estab-
lished through attacks (undercuts, rebuttals) and preference ordering over rules. The most
important systems include ASPIC+ [PM14,Pra12] and abstract dialectical frameworks
(ADFs) in conjunction with the ANGELIC methodology [AA16].
In recent years, rule-based approaches have proven to be easier to operationalize as
they mostly require checking whether rules have been correctly applied. Another advan-
tage of rule-based approaches is that they allow to systematically treat the burden of proof
and different proof standards through the use of default reasoning and prioritisation of
rules respectively.
However, [Ste18] argues that the analogy-account for legal reasoning is preferable
as it better accounts for judicial discretion and as a heuristic to find applicable precedents
as well as reasons to distinguish a case – especially for novel cases. [ABC19] concur with
this analysis but conclude that computational models for analogical reasoning are un-
likely: they would require huge ontologies marred by the problem of subjectivity and the
impossibility to choose between competing ontologies of the same set of facts. They do
however see potential for analogy-based tools for training law-students through ex-post
analysis and assisting law-practitioners in constructing ontologies for novel cases piece-
meal (see e.g. [Ash09]). In this light, we believe that checking the internal coherence of
analogical reasoning, automating some of its aspects and guiding practitioners through
heuristic detection of analogy candidates is in the realm of the feasible. See Sections 4
and 5 for a discussion.
3. Formalizing the Law in Context Graphs
In the rule-based approach legal reasoning is represented as inference in logical calculi.
To this end classical logical calculi are extended by defeasible inference rules or default
assumptions in various rule-based or assumption-based argumentation frameworks – e.g.
ASPIC+ [PM14]or ABA [CˇFST17].
January 2020
In this paper, we adopt this practice, but introduce an important novel feature: in-
stead of using a single, unstructured meaning space, we organize the knowledge, infer-
ence and argumentation into collections of meaning spaces we call theories or contexts
when taking argumentation into account. Importantly, theories are not independent, but
are connected by inheritance and interpretation morphisms, forming theory graphs. This
enables us to combine rule-based and analogical reasoning through theory morphisms.
For argumentation, these morphisms can be used to define conflict relations like attack.
Theory/Context Graphs in MMT For concrete representation of the theory graphs we
use the MMT (Meta Meta Theories) format [RK13].It models formal objects and state-
ments using logical frameworks, in particular the judgments-as-types paradigm.
Formally, theories are sets of object declarations and definitions as well as state-
ments (axioms and theorems). Theory graphs are diagrams in the categories of theories
and morphisms. The former allows for fine-grained specifications of the semantics of
individual objects, and the latter allows for inducing and translating knowledge across
theories.
The possible morphisms in MMT are inclusions, which import all declarations from
the domain to the co-domain, structures, which are like includes but copy and trans-
late all declarations, views, which are semantics-preserving translations from domain to
codomain, and the meta-theory-relation, which behaves like an include for most pur-
poses. We refer the reader to [RK13] for the general theory of theory graphs and [KR19]
for the idea of context graphs; we will introduce the features that are relevant to legal
reasoning using the examples as we go along.
World
Knowledge
+
Legal
Foundation
KvC-Rule
KvC-Aspects
KvC-Lexicon
PvH-FactsPvH-Lexicon
MvS-Rule
MvS-Aspects
MvS-Lexicon
Gray’s Rule
Gray-Cond
Gray-Rule
Default Rule
Default-Cond
Default-Rule
McCarthy’s Rule
McCarthy-Cond
McCarthy-Rule
Figure 1.: Popov v. Hayashi as a Context Graph
The meta-theory re-
lation links a logical
framework to the logics
defined in it, thus for-
malizing the “logics-as-
theories” approach, which
allows us to represent log-
ics and (legal) inference
systems together with the
domains in the MMT sys-
tem. This is an integral
part of the utility of the
MMT system for our ap-
proach, but we will gloss
over this aspect in this pa-
per, concentrating on the
domain-level structure of
legal reasoning and argu-
mentation.
The OMDoc/MMT language is implemented in the MMT system (Meta Meta
Toolset; see [MMT]), which provides an API for the language constructs at all levels and
provides both logical services such as type reconstruction and rewriting and knowledge
management services such as IDE and HTML presentation and browsing of libraries.
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Running Example: Popov vs. Hayashi We will use the seminal case “Popov vs.
Hayashi”[Atk12] – reduced to the salient argumentative backbone – as a running exam-
ple in this paper. The full MMT formalization of the example is available at [PvH20].
The black part in Figure 1 shows a theory graph of legal knowledge. In the center
we have a background “theory” of general legal and world knowledge, which we pre-
suppose here. (In reality, this is – of course – a large, modular theory graph, which is
shared and selectively imported by particular formalizations.) Clustered around this are
formalizations of particular legal knowledge: various precedents and legal rules, which
are theory graphs on their own (see Section 3) and inherit from the background theory
via inclusion morphisms ( in the diagrams in this paper).
Let us now consider the advantages of a modular theory graph over a representation
as an (unstructured) collection of formulae: The first division we can encode concerns
the sources from which the text draws. In Fig. 1 the sources are represented in a context
graph. Typically the distinction is threefold in case law applications:
• Precedents: A collection of already decided cases. Their opinions give concrete
descriptions of the aspects that contributed to the ratio of the decision. A rule es-
tablished by a precedent x is called a rule of x. Fig. 1 contains two precedents cited
in Popov v. Hayashi grouped in green/blue: Keron v. Cashman and Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company v. San Francisco Bank.
• Rules: Some rules are laid down in an abstract form, for example in legal com-
mentary. In Fig. 1 the rule subgraph (grouped in red) contains Gray’s rule which
Judge McCarthy adopted; a default rule (cf. Section 5); and the rule of Popov v.
Hayashi fashioned by Judge McCarthy himself.
• Facts: These are the facts of the case at hand. In Fig. 1 they are grouped in cyan. We
assume the facts to be settled. The problem of evidence valuation could potentially
be addressed with similar methods as we propose here - however we leave this to
future work.
Note that all of these include the world/legal background, and thus the various
groups overlap in that. The shared background makes the formalizations coherent. In
formalization practice this means that all shared or shareable knowledge needs to move
into the background.
The subsumption task the court faces is to establish that the Popov v. Hayashi facts
instantiate the aspects allowing for the application of the rule of Keron v. Cashman.
To this end, the facts of Popov v. Hayashi have to be shown to be analogous to the
legally relevant aspects of Keron v. Cashman with the help of information from the other
subgraphs.
Figure 2.: An MMT Theory
Objects, Statements, and Proofs in MMT Before we
can take a look at the contents of the theories shown
above, we have to discuss the representation of objects
and statements. In MMT we can formalize then as dec-
larations of the form
name : type = definiens
where name is the object name, (optionally) type its type,
and (again optionally) definiens can be used to define the
object.
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Figure 2 shows a snippet of our formalization in MMT surface syntax – we will us a
slightly simplified version of that in the theory graph diagrams below. The theory PvH-
Lexicon contains an inclusion of the theory background – the ? is the syntactic indicator
for theory names – and three object declarations: the key contributors to our example
case. The coloured rectangles are MMT delimiters of various levels.
In the judgments-as-types paradigm MMT employs, we can formalize statements
in the same way. The main trick is to introduce a type constructor `, which – given a
proposition ϕ – constructs the type ` ϕ of all proofs of ϕ . If ` ϕ is non-empty, then ϕ has
a proof, and thus ϕ is a theorem. Thus a declaration c : ` ϕ which declares a constant c of
type ` ϕ entails that ` ϕ is non-empty, and can be seen as an axiom. Note that this trick
also allows us to formalize inference rules in a calculus, e.g. the conjunction elimination
∧E rule of the natural deduction calculus as a function ` ϕ ∧ψ → ` ϕ → ` ψ . With
such rules (and axioms like c above) proofs become terms MMT and theorems become
declarations, e.g. pf :` ϕ = ∧E c c which defines a constant pf of type ` ϕ by the proof
∧E c c from the axiom c : ` ϕ discussed above (used twice).
We will use a meta-theory FOLND formalizing first-order logic and its natural de-
duction calculus which introduces the constants →, `, ∧, ¬, ∀, etc. in the rest of the
paper. All the theory/context graph diagrams should include a node for this theory with
a meta link to all other theories, but we omit these for simplicity.
In Section 5 we will discuss context graphs for argumentation. There we graduate to
graphs that include argumentation relations as special morphisms and a meta-theory for
defeasible aspects of legal reasoning.
Formalizing Precedents, Rules and Facts Rules map sets of legal conditions to sets of
legal consequences. One could capture this characteristic of rules at the object-language
level as is done in rule based argumentation approaches. However to enable analogical
reasoning we opt for a theory-graph-based approach to rules. We regard the legal condi-
tions and consequences as separate theories connected by a theory morphism.
Given a meta-theory, for a formalization of a rule we thus need
1. a legal lexicon of constants specifying the concepts in the rule;
2. a theory of legal conditions specifying when the norm applies;
3. a theory of legal consequences specifying what follows from the rule application.
Figure 3 shows a rule formalization in three theories for the three concerns listed
above. General concepts such as the types “lperson” and “thing” are inherited from the
background knowledge. The lexicon contains the concepts that are to be defined in the
rule. In this case, the predicates “takes steps”, “is interrupted” and their conjunction
“stint”. Condition theories declare a set of conditions necessary for the application of the
rule. E.g. McCarthy’s rule as depicted in Fig. 3 requires an actor and an object and has the
condition-axiom cond stint requiring that the actor takes steps to take possession of the
object and is interrupted. Note that this is similar to approaches using abstract dialectical
frameworks [AA16]. We leave an exploration this connection to future work.
Finally, the theory “McCart-Rule” contains three declarations: a proposition to
which the rule pertains; an object language version of the rule itself; and finally the legal
consequences of the rule application. While the rule is declared axiomatically, the legal
consequences come with a derivation from the condition axioms and the rule axiom. In
Section 4 we will see how this enables us to “inject” an instantiation of the rule as well
as a proof of the legal consequences into the present case where it can then be shared and
translated across theories.
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McCart-Lexicon
takes steps: lperson → thing → bool
is interrupted : lperson → bool
stint : lperson → thing → bool
= [x,y] x takes steps y is interrupted x
McCart-Conditions
actor : lperson
object : thing
cond stint : ` actor stint object
McCart-Rule
McCart proposition = actor has claim object
McCart rule : ` actor stint object ⇒
actor has claim object
McCart cons : ` actor has claim object
= MP McCart rule cond stint
Figure 3. A rule graph for the rule judge McCarthy introduces in his opinion.
Formalization of precedents is very similar to formalization of rules. The main dif-
ference is that in precedent graphs conditions are replaced by aspects – not all of which
may be necessary conditions for application of the rules that the precedent establishes.
Finally, in the present case, it is not apparent yet which facts of the case will be
legally relevant and become aspects. Thus in a present case graph the legal conditions
theory is replaced with a theory describing the case’s facts.
4. Precedent/Rule Application via Views and Pushouts
We have seen the basic “object-oriented” infrastructure of theory graphs above and how
legal knowledge representation can profit from modularity. But for legal reasoning we
utilize an advanced feature of MMT: views and pushouts. In this section we use them to
combine modularity and inference to model analogical reasoning.
KvC-Rule PvH-Ruling
KvC-Aspects
PvH-Asp-McCart
McCart-Rule
McCart-Cond
PvH-Asp-Gray
PvH-Facts
Gray-Cond
Gray-Rule
Default-Rule
Default-Cond
PvH-Asp-Default
MvS-RulePvH-Alt
MvS-Aspects Fig. 8  Fig. 6
 Fig. 7
Figure 4. Generating McCarthy’s and an alternative Ruling from Legal Theories (see Figure 4).
The Running Example continued Fig. 4 depicts an extension of the formalization of
Popov v. Hayashi from Fig. 1 using analogical reasoning. The black part is that of Fig. 1,
but the blue part is generated via pushouts (rectangular subgraphs identified by the
pushout marker ) that correspond to rule/precedent application (see Fig. 5 and the
discussion there).
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Fig. 4 contains the backbone of the argumentation of the Popov v. Hayashi ruling
– leaving out many details that go beyond introducing the context graph paradigm and
thus the scope of this paper. It starts with the established facts (in the theory PvH-Facts)
and applies Gray’s rule to establish that Popov did not obtain possession of the baseball
(and Hayashi did) in PvH-Aspects-Gray. From there, McCarthy would have to apply
the “default rule”: unless there is a “proof” that Popov has possession of the ball we
have to assume that he does not. Subsequently the precedent Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company v. San Francisco Bank (theories MvS-*)applies to obtain the ruling that Popov
has no claim to the ball (PvH-Alt; we abstract away from the discussion of “conversion”).
However he distinguishes the case and instead, introduces a new rule (cf. Fig. 3) which
applied to PvH-Aspects-Gray allows him to derive the required proof that Popov has a
(qualified) right to possess the ball (theory PvH-Asp-McCart). Finally, this enables him
to apply the precedent Keron v. Cashman (KvC-*) ruling that ownership of the ball is to
be split between Popov and Hayashi (theory PvH-Ruling). Note that Judge McCarthy’s
ruling PvH-Ruling contradicts and defeats the default ruling PvH-Alt as indicated by the
red attack relations.
The three rectangular patterns marked by “ Fig. n” in Fig. 4 warrant a closer look,
we will discuss them in detail below, after we introduce the general principles of views
and pushouts in MMT.
Views Given theories S and T , a view S
ϕ
T states that T is more specific than S
after applying the translation ϕ from all symbols of S to T -expressions. Views have a
range of intuitive readings: In mathematics, where the notion originates, views are used to
formalize examples, interpretation, and even the model relation. In computer science we
can use views to formalize specification refinements and the implementation relations. In
this paper we use it for analogy: S and T are instances of the same (possibly unknown)
theory G and ϕ an analogy between S and T .
Pushouts The category T of theories and theory morphisms admits colimits and thus
pushouts – a special colimit: Given a theory A with two morphisms A B and ψ :
A C, the pushout of A and B (along ψ) is the “minimal” theory P that combines B
and C identifying material from A.
Rule Conditions Rule Consequences
Present Case Facts Ruling
Application
Figure 5.: Application of a rule
Precedent Application can be viewed
as an instance of analogical reasoning
in case law and can thus be formal-
ized as a pushout. The precedent and the
present case are construed as instances of
the same abstract rule established by the
precedent. Applying a precedent A to a
present case B corresponds to construct-
ing a view ϕ from the legal conditions of a rule established in A to the facts of B. In
essence, pushouts can be interpreted as a meta-language Modus Ponens rule: we can ap-
ply the “rule” A B to C if C can be interpreted (i.e. connected with a view) as less
specific than A. The pushout P is the result of the “rule application”. Figure 5 on the right
shows the general pattern; it underlies all of the pushouts in Fig. 4 – with refinements
that we discuss below.
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Crucially, the MMT system can compute pushouts: the information in A, B, C, and ϕ
fully determines all declarations in P [CMR17]; in particular, all names can be generated.
This is the basis for the generated (blue) theories in Figure Fig. 4. A detailed example
is provided by Fig. 6: here the theory PvH-Aspects-Default is subsumed under the rule
established by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. San Francisco Bank through the
view precedent application. The pushout corresponds to the rule application and creates
the ruling: ` ¬Popov has claim ball).
5. Operationalizing Analogical Reasoning in Context Graphs
In the pushout model of rule-application in the last section, views operationalize “ana-
logical transfer”, but the legal literature has identified some additional requirements. In
this section we show how these can be modeled.
Analogical Reasoning [Ste18] establishes a list of critical questions to analogical rea-
soning and [ABC19] remarks on the difficulty of operationalizing them for a computa-
tional model. Table 1 shows our proposed operationalization of each of these questions.
We will discuss the first three using the Popov v. Hayashi example. We conjecture that
A4 can be handled by considering values (as is done e.g. in [BCS03]) in addition to rules
and prececents but we leave this to future work.
A1 Are A and B similar in a legally relevant
way?
Is there a partial view ϕ from the present case A to
a suitable formalization of the precedent B?
A2 Can a successful mapping be made to an
aspect of the present-case for every aspect
of the precedent-case that the opinion high-
lights enough to indicate that it is part of the
ratio in the opinion?
Does ϕ’s image in B include all the conditions for
the application of a/the rule of B
A3 Does the surrounding law allow present-case
and precedent-case to be mapped success-
fully?
Is there any unjustified default in the interpretation
of the present case? Does another precedent attack
and defeat the currently considered precedent?
A4 Are there no legally relevant differences be-
tween A and B?
Is ϕ−1 onto A? If not, is there an A-declaration a
outside ϕ−1(ϕ(B)) such that a is viewed by an im-
portant legal principle.
Table 1. Analogical Reasoning according to the Literature
A1: Identifying legally relevant similarities The first problem in constructing a prece-
dent application consists in identifying which aspects (if any) of the precedent are legally
relevant to the present case. This can be done by viewing the precedent from the perspec-
tive of the present case [Ste18].
We can understand this process in a conservative and constructive way. Under the
conservative interpretation, it corresponds to the fact that views map to expressions. In
this way, views expose new (derivable) aspects of an already given formalization of the
precedent that have not been explicitly declared.
Here, a little logical clarification is in order: consider the precedent application view
ϕ in Fig. 6. By the theory morphism property, it has to map every constant without
definition to an expression in PvH-Asp-Default. The interesting case is the last: in MvS-
Aspects Aspect is an axiom of type ` A1∧A2∧A3, so it must be mapped to an (proof)-
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PvH-Asp-Default
Popov : lperson
ball : thing
notitle = ¬ Popov has title ball
noright = ¬ Popov has right ball
nopos = ¬ Popov posess ball
notitle df : p∼ notitle
noright df : p∼ noright
nopos thm: : ` nopos
= MP gray rule (∧Er Fact2)
Π =∧I (aid notitle df)
(aid noright df) nopos thm
Hayashi : lperson
Fact1 : ` Hayashi has control ball
∧ Hayashi has intent ball
MvS-Aspects
relevance-Reduct
InsCorp: lperson
money : thing
A1 = ¬ InsCorp has title money
A2 = ¬ InsCorp has right money
A3 = ¬ InsCorp posess money
Aspect : ` A1 ∧ A2 ∧ A3
include ?relevance-Reduct
check : thing
bank : lperson
PvH-Alt
proposition = Popov has claim ball
rule = ` notitle ∧ noright ∧ nopos ⇒ ¬ proposition
ruling : ` ¬ proposition = MP rule Π
ϕ =

InsCorp 7→ Popov
money 7→ ball
Aspect 7→Π
MvS-Rule
proposition = InsCorp has claim money
rule : Aspect ⇒ ¬ proposition
ruling : ` ¬ proposition = MP rule Aspect
ϕ: precedent application
relevance
Figure 6. Identifying legally relevant aspects of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. San Francisco Bank.
expression of type ` notitle∧noright∧nopos, we call this a proof obligation of ϕ . This
obligation is fulfilled by the proof term ϕ(Aspect) =Π.
Under the constructive interpretation, the precedent’s formalization itself is to be
guided by the present case. This can be done through a special definitorial variant of a
view – called structure in MMT – where we import, rename and define content from
the present case. This then serves as the starting point for a full formalization of the
precedent. Here we will focus on the conservative interpretation.
In both cases, formally we have to ensure that there is a (partial) view from the
present case’s facts to the precedent case’s aspects. As we are usually only interested
in capturing part of the present case, this view will usually not be total. E.g. deciding
whether Popov has a claim to the ball or not as in Fig. 6 does not require us to map facts
pertaining to Hayashi.
Fig. 6 shows how the precedent Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. San Fran-
cisco Bank which Judge McCarthy used to assess whether Popov can sue for conver-
sion is viewed (conservatively) in light of the facts of Popov v. Hayashi. In Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company v. San Francisco Bank an insurance company sued a bank over
the “conversion” of checks issued to non-existing persons by a fraudulent employee and
money that had been paid out on receipt of these checks. The court ruled that the money
could not have been converted based on the precedent that depositors have no claim to
specific assets in a bank. In becoming a leading case, the “rule of the case” abstracted
from this is that “someone who has no title, possession or right to possession of an object
cannot sue for conversion of that object”[Atk12, p.6]. Judge McCarthy is interested in
applying this rule to Popov’s situation. Under the default assumption (cf. Section 5) that
Popov has no right to possession of the ball, the mapping is onto the application condi-
tions of the rule established by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. San Francisco
Bank. In this way the mapping separates the presently legally relevant aspects from the
irrelevant ones (everything concerning the checks, the relationship between the money
and the checks, the differences between money and baseballs, etc.).
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A2: Totality of Precedent Application Next we need to check whether the precedent is
applicable. This is the case if the reduct of the precedent induced by the present case
meets all the application conditions of a rule of the precedent case - as obtains in Fig. 6.
There the partial view relevance carves out a reduct of Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany v. San Francisco Bank that suffices to apply the case’s rule. This implies that by
inverting relevance we get a total view precedent application that allows to map the rule
conditions to the present case - thereby enabling rule application via pushout.
However, even partial views from precedents may be useful in the act of distinguish-
ing and with theory construction in “hard” cases. The greater the proportion of the prece-
dent that can be mapped, the higher should it be regarded as a candidate for a theory con-
struction starting point. In addition, partial views can serve as heuristics to find complete
ones. MMT is already equipped with a view finder system that can find simple total and
partial views. This may help practitioners in finding precedent candidates quickly.
A3: Defaults and Defeasibility A precedent application is binding if ϕ covers all
“legally relevant” aspects of B. Else the court may be justified to distinguish B from A,
that is defeat the application of A to B either by finding a better precedent A′ or by setting
a precedent itself by adopting a new rule (or, as we see in the next example, both). Thus
analogical precedent application – just as the application of legal rules – is defeasible.
On the other hand some rules apply by default if the burden of proof of no other applica-
ble rule can be met. The paradigmatic example is the principle “innocent unless proven
guilty”. Defaults and defeasibility can be implemented in context graphs through MMT’s
derived modules. For example, in [KR19] we implemented ABA in this way. Here we
combine this approach with analogical reasoning.
Default Reasoning Default reasoning is one of the most important defeasible modes of
inference in legal reasoning. The defeasibility of defaults arises from two circumstances:
the proof search may not have been exhaustive or new information or rules may have
been added to the knowledge base that render formerly unprovable statements provable.
Both situations arise in the law: the first corresponds to a relevant rule from the
surrounding law having been ignored; the second arises when new evidence comes to
light or a court decides to fashion a new rule. The latter is what happened in Popov v.
Hayashi.
Following our approach in [KR19] we model the default reasoning in Popov v.
Hayashi by instantiating ABA. To this end we enrich our metalanguage with an assump-
tion operator p∼: bool −→ type and a strict inference rule aid : {x : bool} p∼ x−→` x.
Default-Cond
Prop : bool
Default-Rule
proposition = Prop
default : p∼ ¬ Prop
PvH-Asp-Gray
. . .
PvH-Facts
PvH-Asp-Default
noright df : p∼ ¬ Popov has right ball
. . .
Prop 7→ Popov has right ball
Figure 7. Inference by default: If Popov’s right to possession cannot be proven, it is assumed that he has none.
Fig. 7 shows the situation in which Judge McCarthy finds himself after having in-
ferred via Gray’s rule that Popov does not have possession of the ball. Since he obvi-
ously does not have a title (this default is left implicit in the opinion), it remains to check
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whether he has a right to possession. In the absence of an applicable rule establishing
a right to possession for Popov, it remains to apply the default rule to infer that he has
no such right. Note that the default rule’s only condition is that the input variable be a
proposition and it creates an assumption indicated by p∼. Hence anything can be assumed
by default and together with the rule aid we may get inconsistent theories. However, this
is unproblematic as such theories are self-attacking (cf. Fig. 8).
Defeasibility In Popov v. Hayashi Judge McCarthy was unhappy with this default out-
come and instead decided to fashion a new rule. McCarthy’s rule views PvH-Asp-Gray
and via pushout establishes Popov’s claim to the ball based on his interrupted efforts to
catch it. This new situation now matches the precedent Keron v. Cashman which he ap-
plies. However, his ruling is now in conflict with the default ruling. How can this conflict
be resolved?
PvH-Aspects-McCart
Popov right : ` Popov has right ball
= MP McCarthy-Rule (∧Er Fact2)
. . .
PvH-Aspects-Default
df-noright : p∼ ¬ Popov has right ball
. . .
PvH-Ruling
PvH proposition = Popov has claim Ball
PvH rule = Popov has right Ball ⇒
Popov has claim Ball
PvH ruling: ` PvH proposition
= MP Ruling Popov Right
PvH-Alt
PvH proposition = Popov has claim Ball
PvH rule: ` notitle ∧ noright ∧ nopos ⇒
¬ PvH proposition
PvH ruling: ` ¬ Popov has claim Ball
= MP PvH rule (∧I aid title-df aid
right-df nopos-ax)
Def.
Defeater
Proof : ` Prop
Kernel
Prop: bool
Assumption
Ass : p∼ ¬ Prop
Figure 8. Inheriting an Attack Relation
Fig. 8 shows how McCarthy’s rule allows to prove the negation – technically, the
ABA contrary – of the default assumption df-noright. In theory graphs, attack can be
defined by elaboration into a subgraph(for details see [KR19]). In Fig. 8, the light blue
diagram is the elaboration of the red attack arrows: Prop is mapped to PvH proposition,
Proof to Popov right and Ass to df-noright. This corresponds to the ABA definition of
attack according to which a set of assumptions A attacks a set of assumptions B if A
allows to derive the contrary (here: negation) of an assumption in B.
If we apply one of the usual labelings (admissible grounded, preferred, ideal, . . . )
to the resulting attack graph, PvH Aspects Default is defeated and hence the precedent
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. San Francisco Bank is distinguished as its con-
ditions cannot be mapped into PvH Aspects McCart.
6. Conclusion and Outlook
We have modeled the well-known case Popov v. Hayashi in theory/context graphs, a
new, structured, logic-based framework for legal reasoning and argumentation. We have
shown that the mechanism of pushouts is well-suited to model precedent and rule ap-
plication and the views involved can adequately capture the analogical transfer in ap-
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plication. Moreover, the modular structure of theory graphs nicely captures the intuitive
structure of world and legal knowledge In essence, our approach lifts legal reasoning and
argumentation to the theory level and the graph structure can be used to drive the pro-
cess. This can be used to foster human understanding of complex legal arguments via the
theory graph diagrams and can ultimately support legalTech services like subsumption
checking, precedence case finding, and even educational applications in the long run.
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